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Workmen's Compensation
By W.R. PATTERSON, JR.*
In 1976, the Kentucky Supreme Court and practicing Bar
found themselves still reeling from their efforts to interpret and
apply the workmen's compensation legislation adopted by the
1972 General Assembly. No other area of Kentucky law has
been so "worked carefully upon, beat soundly, thwacked re-
peatedly, drubbed, and assailed verbally."' This article will
survey recent Kentucky cases which expose the infirmities of
the Kentucky workmen's compensation system, infirmities
which, for the most part, will respond to a poultice that only
the General Assembly can apply.
I. COMPUTATION OF BENEFITS
C.E. Pennington Co. v. Winburn2 and Apache Coal Co. v.
Fuller3 were the two most important workmen's compensation
cases decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court during the past
survey year. The two cases interpret the Kentucky statutes
which regulate computation of compensation benefits,4 and
both are cases of first impression.
The Workmen's Compensation Board awarded the em-
ployee in Pennington $39.25 per week for life for a 20 percent
permanent partial disability, and the Fayette Circuit Court
affirmed. The employer appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the
Board had incorrectly calculated the benefits to be awarded
under the applicable statutes-Kentucky Revised Statutes § §
342.730 and .740 [hereinafter cited as KRS].
KRS § 342.730(1)(b) provides in part that in cases of per-
manent partial disability:
* Partner in the firm of Landrum, Patterson & Dickey, Lexington, Kentucky.
B.A. 1959, Vanderbilt University; J.D. 1963, University of Kentucky.
Kotsiris v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Ky. 1970).
2 537 S.W.2d 167 (Ky. 1976).
3 541 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1976).
1 The Kentucky statutes which regulate computation of benefits are: Ky. Rxv.
STAT. § 342.730, .740, and .610 [hereinafter cited as KRS].
I Sixty percent of the average weekly wage of the state is $81. See C.E. Pennington
Co. v. Winburn, 537 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Ky. 1976).
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The compensation paid therefor shall be 55 percent of the
average weekly earnings of the employe . . . and two and
one-half per cent . . for each dependent up to a maximum
of three, subject to the limitations contained in KRS 342.740,
multiplied by the percentage of disability . . . [emphasis
added].
The employee had average weekly earnings at the time of his
injury of $314. KRS § 342.740(1), to which KRS § 342.730(1) (b)
makes reference, provides in part that:
The minimum weekly income benefits for disability shall not
be less than 20 percent. . . and the maximum weekly income
benefit shall not exceed 60 per cent. . . of the average weekly
wage of the state as defined herein [$81] .'
Both the employer and the employee in Pennington agreed
that the first step in calculating the employee's benefits under
KRS § 342.730(1)(b) was to multiply the employee's weekly
wage, $314, by 62.5 percent (55 percent plus 2.5 percent for
each of his three dependents), which would equal $196.25.
However, they disagreed as to the next step in calculating
benefits. KRS § 342.730 directs that the weekly wage be multi-
plied by 62.5 percent, "subject to the limitations contained in
KRS § 342.740 multiplied by the percentage of disability."
The employer contended that KRS § 342.730 dictated that
the $196.25 figure (62.5 percent x $314) be reduced to $81,
since, on the basis of the statutory language, $196.25 was
"subject to" the $81 limitation of KRS § 342.740. Thus, the
issue was whether $196.25 or $81 should be multiplied by 20
percent (the employee's percentage of disability). Twenty per-
cent of $81 yields $16.20 and twenty percent of $196.25 yields
$39.25-a substantial difference when spread over a lifetime.6
In all cases of permanent partial disability, under the em-
ployer's construction of KRS § 342.730, an employee's weekly
wage should be multiplied by 55 percent, plus 2.5 percent for
each dependent (up to a maximum of three), and that figure,
if more than $81, should be reduced to $81, and then multiplied
6 Pennington was 39 years old and had a life expectancy of 28.9 years (1,502.8
weeks), according to the American Experience Table of Mortality. Weekly benefits of
$39.25 amount to $25.05 more per week than weekly benefits of $16.20-a difference
of almost $35,000 in additional benefits during Pennington's life expectancy.
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by the percentage of disability. Under the employee's construc-
tion of KRS § 342.730, the weekly wage should first be multi-
plied by 55 percent plus 2.5 percent for each dependent (up to
a maximum of three), then that figure should be multiplied by
the percentage of disability, and then that figure should be
reduced to $81, pursuant to KRS § 342.740, if it exceeds $81.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Justice
Jones, agreed with the employee's construction of KRS §
342.740, stating:
Pennington and its insurance carrier argue that the sum of
$81.00 must be multiplied by the percentage of disability
(20%) which would award Winburn the sum of $16.20, and
that the board erred in not so doing. This Court is of the
opinion that KRS 342.740 imposes no such limitation. Since
the award of $32.25 per week to Winburn is under the maxi-
mum of $81.00 per week, the board's award was proper
Thus, the Court concluded that the $81 limitation of KRS §
342.740 was applicable only after all other calculations indi-
cated in the statute yielded a figure in excess of $81. This
approach would almost certainly be the correct one if the Gen-
eral Assembly had placed the "subject to" language of KRS §
342.730 at the end of the sentence. However, because the "sub-
ject to" language appears in the sentence after "compensation
shall be 55 per cent of the average weekly earnings" and before
"multiplied by the percentage of disability," the majority opin-
ion's construction of KRS § 342.730 appears to be, in effect, a
rewriting of the statute.
Justice Palmore in a dissenting opinion8 with which Chief
Justice Reed concurred, said that:
Assuming that the drafter of the statute had some degree of
proficiency in the use of the English language and had a
conscious reason for this placement of the "subject to"
phrase, it can only mean that the $81.00 limitation of KRS
342.740 applies to the percentage-of-wage figure, and not to
the fraction of that figure represented by percentage of disa-
bility. I am therefore convinced that the majority opinion
does not comport with the statute, for which reason I dissent.,
7 537 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Ky. 1976).
' Id. at 168-69.
' Id. at 168.
1976]
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While the majority of the Court in Pennington was doing
its best to clarify that which defies clarification,'" its construc-
tion of KRS §§ 342.730 and.740 will result in marked inequi-
ties. Consider, for example, two employees, both of whom have
three dependents and an average weekly wage of $314. Assume
that both employees receive work-related injuries which result
in a 100 percent disability to one and a 41.3 percent disability
to the other. Under the computation formula prescribed by
Pennington, the totally disabled employee would receive the
maximum benefit of $81 per week;" however, the employee
with only a 41.3 percent disability would also receive an $81
weekly benefit. 2 If the $81 limitation of KRS § 342.740 were
applied to the percentage-of-weekly-wage figure, the employee
with the 41.3 percent disability would receive $33.45 in weekly
benefits.' 3
In Apache Coal Co. v. Fuller,'4 the Court applied the for-
mula it had developed in Pennington and further construed
KRS § 342.740 in relation to KRS § 342.730. The Court held,
in effect, that any employee with a work-related permanent
partial disability is entitled, regardless of the percentage of his
disability, to a minimum of $27 in weekly compensation bene-
fits.
The employee in Apache had an average weekly wage of
$170, and supported two dependents. The Board found that he
had an occupational disability of 20 percent, and following the
computation formula in Pennington, awarded him $20.40 per
week.' 5 The employee appealed to the circuit court, arguing
that under KRS § 342.740, he was entitled to a minimum of
" Justice Lukowsky said of these statutes, in Apache Coal Co. v. Fuller, 541
S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1976):
These statutes rival the Internal Revenue Code in complexity and contradic-
tion.
A careful examination of these statutes will quickly establish that a
sentence by sentence dissection and attempted reconciliation would serve
only to confound confusion in a field already replete-wvith inconsistency.
" $314 x 62.5 percent = $196.25, subject to the $81 limitation.
" $314 x 62.5 percent x 41.3 percent = $81.05, subject to the $81 limitation.
,3 $314 x 62.5 percent = $196.25, subject to the $81 limitation; $81 x 41.3 percent
= $33.45.
" 541 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1976).
, $170 x 60 percent = $102 x 20 percent = $20.40.
[Vol. 65
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"20 percent. . . of the average weekly wage of the state""5 or
$27. The circuit court agreed, and the Supreme Court affirmed,
stating that:
In C.E. Pennington Co., Inc. v. Winburn ...we held
that the maximum limitation applied to income benefits to
be paid for partial disability not to the product of average
weekly earnings multiplied by fifty-five to sixty-two and one
half percent as the number of dependents might require. Fol-
lowing this rationale to its logical conclusion, we are of the
opinion that the minimum limitation applies to income bene-
fits to be paid for partial disability and not only to cases of
total disability .... ,7
Apache, when applied by the Board, will result in inequi-
ties similar to those discussed above in connection with
Pennington. Consider, for example, two employees, each of
whom has two dependents and an average weekly wage of $170,
as did the employee in Apache. Assume that both employees
receive work-related injuries, and that one suffers a 25.5 per-
cent disability while the other incurs a 1 percent disability. By
computing their benefits under KRS §§ 342.730 and .740 as
directed by the Court in Apache, both employees would receive
$27 in weekly benefits."8
The impact of Apache is staggering. The employee in the
above hypothetical with the 1 percent disability would be enti-
tled to benefits of $1.02 per week under KRS § 342.730. With
a life expectancy of 2194.4 weeks, he would receive $2,238.29 in
lifetime benefits. However, when the $27 weekly minimum of
KRS § 342.740 is applied to the partial permanent disability
benefits of KRS § 342.730, the employee's lifetime benefits rise
dramatically to $59,248.80. It hardly needs to be said that a
statutory scheme is outrageous at best which permits an em-
ployee to receive as much as $60,000 for a 1 percent disability.
While the Court could have easily avoided the result it
achieved in Pennington merely by giving § 342.730 a common
sense construction, its construction of KRS § 342.740 in
' KRS § 342.740(1).
" Apache Coal Co. v. Fuller, 541 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Ky. 1976).
" $170 x 60 percent = 102 x 25.5 percent = $26.01, which must be increased to




Apache was probably mandated by the express language of the
statute. In the final analysis, however, the Court can hardly be
faulted for the decision it reached in either case, since, even the
Court has said:
These statutes rival the Internal Revenue Code in complexity
and contradiction. Their seeming internal inconsistency and
inconsistency with each other is hypnotic and soporific.
A careful examination of these statutes will quickly es-
tablish that a sentence by sentence dissection and attempted
reconciliation would serve only to confound confusion in a
field already replete with inconsistency."
Pennington and Apache precipitated dramatic rises in
workmen's compensation insurance costs which, in turn,
caused a public outcry by employers and their insurers. The
Kentucky General Assembly addressed the problem by conven-
ing in special session in the fall of 1976 and, in effect, statuto-
rily overruling Apache. It amended KRS § 342.730(1)(b) by
adding the following language: "[N]otwithstanding any sec-
tion of KRS Chapter 342 to the contrary, there shall be no
minimum weekly income benefit for permanent partial disabil-
ity." The amendment became effective on January 1, 1977.
While Apache will not apply to work-related injuries or expo-
sures after that date, it will continue to have a considerable
impact on all claims for injuries or exposures arising between
January 1, 1973 and December 31, 1976, which have not been
finally adjudicated.
II. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
In Fields v. Twin City Drive-In,"' the Court ended specula-
tion that independent contractors are "employees," within the
meaning of the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act.2' It
, Apache Coal Co. v. Fuller, 541 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1976).
534 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. 1976).
21 The applicable provisions of KRS § 342.640 are as follows:
The following shall constitute employees subject to the provisions of this
chapter except as exempted under KRS 342.650:
(1) Every person, including a minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully
employed, in the service of an employer under any contract of hire or appren-
ticeship, express or implied, and all helpers and assistants of employes
[Vol. 65
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held that they are not. The Court acknowledged that the Act
contemplates that employment relationships arise out of ex-
press or implied contracts, but it said that: "It does not neces-
sarily follow, however, that all persons working under a con-
tract are employees as contemplated by the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. '22
In Elkhorn-Hazard Coal Land Corp. v. Taylor,2 the Court
likened a lessor of mineral rights to an "owner" and a lessee to
an independent contractor, and held that the lessor was not
liable to an employee of the lessee for workmen's compensation
benefits. 24 Elkhorn-Hazard had leased certain coal lands to M
& A Coal Company and retained a royalty interest. Taylor, an
employee of M & A, sought total disability benefits for pneu-
moconiosis. Since M & A was uninsured, Taylor also named
the Uninsured Employers Fund and the Special Fund as defen-
dants. An enterprising attorney for the Uninsured Employers
Fund moved that the Fund be dismissed and that Elkhorn-
Hazard be made a party defendant. The Uninsured Employers
Fund's theory was that Elkhorn-Hazard was to be deemed a
contractor pursuant to KRS § 342.610(2), which provides that
a contractor who subcontracts all or a part of a contract shall
be liable for the payment of compensation benefits to employ-
ees of the subcontractor." Thus, the issue was whether the
whether paid by the employer or employe, if employed with the knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the employer.
= 534 S.W.2d 457, 458 (Ky. 1976). The Court further said: "The phrase 'contract
of hire' does not add some magic quality to the basic concept of the Act. A sow's ear
is a sow's ear, regardless of what it is called." Id. at 459. For an earlier discussion of
"contracts of hire" see Duke v. Brown Hotel Co., 481 S.W.2d 289 (Ky. 1972). The
"independent contractor" defense provided by Fields is, needless to say, important to
attorneys who do workmen's compensation defense work.
539 S.W.2d 101 (Ky. 1976).
2 It should be noted that the employee was not without ultimate relief, since he
had a right to claim compensation benefits against the Uninsured Employers Fund.
23 The exact language of KRS § 342.610(2) is as follows:
A contractor who subcontracts all or any part of a contract and his carrier
shall be liable for the payment of compensation to the employes of the
subcontractor unless the subcontractor primarily liable for the payment of
such compensation has secured the payment of compensation as provided for
in this chapter. Any contractor or his carrier who shall become liable for such
compensation may recover the amount of such compensation paid and
necessary expenses from the subcontractor primarily liable therefor. A per-
son who contracts with another (a) to have work performed consisting of the
removal, excavation or drilling of soil, rock or mineral, or the cutting or
19761
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lease executed by Elkhorn-Hazard to M & A Coal Company
constituted a "contract," within the meaning of KRS §
342.610(2), to have work performed by M & A for Elkhorn-
Hazard. The Court held, no doubt much to the relief of owners
of Kentucky mineral interests, that a lessor under such circum-
stances is not a "contractor" who is liable to a lessee's (subcon-
tractor's) employees for compensation benefits. 26
IMl. WORK RELATED CHANGE IN THE HUMAN ORGANISM
Under the previous Workmen's Compensation Act, 27 in
order to establish eligibility for benefits, an employee was re-
quired to prove that he had sustained a traumatic, personal,
injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of his
employment." Under present law, an employee need only prove
that he has sustained a "work related harmful change in the
human organism .... "2 While the definitional differences
between the former and present statutes regarding what is
compensable may be subtle, the current Act does bring within
the realm of compensability many claims which formerly
would have been dismissed."
In Yocom v. Pierce31 the Court was asked to decide
whether, in the absence of an injury or accident, an employee's
removal of timber from land, or (b) to have work performed of a kind which
is a regular or recurrent part of the work of the trade, business, occupation
or profession of such person, shall for the purposes of this section be deemed
a contractor, and such other person a subcontractor. This subsection shall
not apply to the owner or lessee of land principally used for agriculture
(emphasis added).
1B The Court stated:
If this were a sale of coal in place to M & A Coal Company we do not think
it could be contended successfully that the seller has an obligation to provide
workmen's compensation coverage for the employees of the purchaser en-
gaged in the mining of coal. Although this lease cannot technically be con-
strued to be a sale of the coal deposit in place, the ownership of that part of
the coal deposit actually separated from the surface and mined was trans-
ferred from the lessor to the lessee. This fact strengthens the conclusion that
M & A Coal Company was not performing work for Elkhorn-Hazard under
the lease.
Elkhorn-Hazard Coal Land Corp. v. Taylor, 539 S.W.2d 101, 104 (Ky. 1976).
" Ky. AcTs ch. 77, § 2 (1952), repealed by Ky. AcTs ch. 78, § 36 (1972).
28 Id.
" KRS § 342.620(1).
" See infra note 33.
31 534 S.W.2d 796 (Ky. 1976).
[Vol. 65
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nervous breakdown was a "work related harmful change in the
human organism .. *"32 The claimant was an employee of a
clothing manufacturer whose job required considerable concen-
tration in matching different colors of thread with the threads
in garments being manufactured. She claimed that the pres-
sures of her job ultimately caused her nervous breakdown. The
employer argued that compensation benefits should be denied
in the absence of physical trauma. The Court disagreed and
interpreted the present definition of compensable claims as
reflecting an intent by the General Assembly to broaden the
scope of compensability. The Court, therefore, affirmed an
award to the employee.-
Although the level and kind of proof required to show an
"accident" had become less stringent even prior to the present
Act, 34 the Court has now made it clear that no accident or
traumatic injury need be proven to establish the compensabil-
ity of a claim. Of course, one must still establish through expert
medical evidence that an employee's condition is work re-
lated,35 except in heart attack cases. The Court has held that
in heart attack cases, the Workmen's Compensation Board
may view the "totality of circumstances"3 and make a finding
as to whether the employee's heart attack was related to a
"work-connected event, ' 38 even in the absence of medical evi-
dence.
32 KRS § 342.620(1).
31 Under Kentucky law prior to 1972, a claim for compensation due to traumatic
neurosis or other psychological disturbances was only honored upon a showing that the
condition had arisen out of a traumatic injury to the employee. See Mays v. Potter &
Brumfield, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. 1968); E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Whit-
son, 399 S.W.2d 734 (Ky. 1966).
1, See Hudson v. Owens, 439 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1969), in which the Court stated:
Accidental result is enough to constitute an accidental injury.
In short, a fortuitous unexpected injury to the workman, traceable to the
performance of his work, is sufficient to provide the accidental quality de-
manded by our compensation statute.
-1 Medical evidence may not be required where it is within the realm of common
knowledge that an accident suffered will cause a particular injury, i.e., that a severe
blow to the head will cause headaches, and that severe shock will produce nervousness.
See Tatham v. Palmer, 439 S.W.2d 938 (Ky. 1969).
' See Hudson v. Owens, 439 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1969).
37 Moore v. Square D Co., 518 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Ky. 1975). For a discussion of
Moore, see Patterson, Kentucky Law Survey-Workmen's Compensation, 64 Ky. L.J.
307, 313-17 (1975).




The Court also decided in Yocom v. Pierce" that a claim-
ant's preexisting "personality makeup or structure" could be
a dormant disabling "disease or condition," within the mean-
ing of KRS § 342.120, which would make the Special Fund
liable in the event of the preexisting condition's arousal. Prior
to the 1972 amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act,
liability had been imposed upon the Special Fund only in those
cases involving the arousal of a preexisting "dormant non-
disabling disease condition.""0 KRS § 342.120(1)(b) now makes
the Special Fund liable in the event of an arousal of a preexist-
ing "dormant disease or condition." The Court had held, prior
to the adoption of the present Act, that a person's low emo-
tional threshold and his preexisting personality makeup were
not "disease conditions."" In Yocom v. Pierce the Court held
that "there is no room for doubt that the statute now refers to
a condition separate and apart from a disease.""2 Thus, an
employee's preexisting personality makeup can now be a
condition for which the Special Fund will be liable in the event
of an arousal of the condition by a subsequent work-related
event.
V. UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND
Questions continue to arise as to the proper procedures for
an employee to follow in establishing that he is entitled to be
paid benefits by the Uninsured Employers Fund.43 In Yocom v.
Campbell," an employee was found to be permanently and
totally disabled, and his award was apportioned 75 percent
against the Special Fund and 25 percent against the employer.
The order provided that all sums were to be paid by the Special
9 534 S.W.2d 796 (Ky. 1976).
, For a discussion of the significance of the insertion of the word "or" between
"disease" and "condition," see Yocom v. Gibbs, 525 S.W.2d 744 (Ky. 1975) and Patter-
son, supra note 37, at 311.
11 See Yocom v. Tri-County Sanitation Service, Inc., 522 S.W.2d 850 (Ky. 1975);
Yocom v. Fleming, 492 S.W.2d 194 (Ky. 1973); Merritt Clothing Co. v. Jewell, 459
S.W.2d 88 (Ky. 1970).
'2 534 S.W.2d at 799.
4 For a previous discussion of this matter see Patterson, supra note 37, at 309.
" 536 S.W.2d 470 (Ky. 1976).
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Fund, subject to reimbursement by the employer. The Unin-
sured Employers Fund was made a party to the proceedings
since the employer was uninsured and had not qualified as a
self-insured. The Special Fund sought an order of reimburse-
ment from the Uninsured Employers Fund prior to making any
payments to the employee, in order to avoid the necessity of
obtaining reimbursement from the employer through civil liti-
gation. The Board and the lower court refused such an order,
and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, likening the Unin-
sured Employers Fund to a surety which has no duty to pay
until the principal either fails to pay or is adjudicated unable
to pay.4" The Court held that until the Special Fund has made
a payment to the employee on behalf of the employer and
unsuccessfully sought reimbursement from the employer, the
question of its rights against the Uninsured Employers Fund
remains academic. Thus, the Court held that the issues were
not properly joined. It noted further that the Board is not re-
quired to give advisory opinions based on hypothetical fact
situations, and that there is no provision for an "administrative
declaratory judgment" action." If the order of the Board had
not required the Special Fund to pay the sums assessed against
the employer, subject to reimbursement, the employee could
have recovered from the Uninsured Employers Fund only after
he had reduced his award against the employer to judgment
and found no property uponwhich to execute. The Court has
wisely placed this burden upon the Special Fund instead of
upon employees who are often in need of immediate benefits.
Other cases involving the Uninsured Employers Fund were
Davis v. Baker"7 and Davis v. Comer." Both cases involve the
time at which the Uninsured Employers Fund can or should be
made a party to the proceedings. In Baker, the Uninsured
Employers Fund was not made a party until after the case had
been submitted and briefed. The Fund moved to dismiss,
claiming that it had been prejudiced by the delay in joining it,
and that the Board lacked jurisdiction. The Board dismissed
1 Id. at 471. The Court cited KRS § 342.760 and Davis v. Turner, 519 S.W.2d 820
(Ky. 1975) in support of this proposition.
" Yocom v. Campbell, 536 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Ky. 1976).
530 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1975).
" 532 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. 1975).
1976]
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the employee's claim on the merits, but did not rule on the
jurisdictional question raised by the Fund. The circuit court
held on appeal that the Board had erred in dismissing the
claim, and the matter was remanded to the Board with direc-
tions to enter a new opinion and order. The Uninsured Employ-
ers Fund appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, raising the
issue of whether the Fund had standing to prosecute an appeal.
In holding that it did the Court observed that the judgment
remanding the case was an appealable judgment, and that the
Fund had a "real and direct"49 interest in the controversy since
the Fund was a beneficiary of the Board's earlier order dismiss-
ing the claim, and, since the claimant had made the Fund a
defendant before the Board.
In the Comer decision the claimant did not move the name
the Uninsured Employers Fund as a party defendant until sev-
eral months after the award had been entered. The Board de-
nied the motion, and the claimant filed an action in circuit
court against all of the parties, including the Uninsured Em-
ployers Fund, demanding that the Fund be required to pay the
judgment. The lower court granted the claimant's petition and
the Fund appealed. The Kentucky Supreme Court noted that
the circuit court action was in the nature of an original proceed-
ing to enforce an award. The employer had failed to pay the
award, a writ of execution had been issued and returned nulla
bona, and judgment was then entered against the Uninsured
Employers Fund. In distinguishing an earlier case, Travelers
Insurance Co. v. Cole,"0 the Court cited the difference between
an original action in the circuit court under KRS § 342.285 and
an ex parte proceeding under KRS § 342.305. In the former, it
held that although the Fund may be made a party to the
Board's proceedings, there was no statutory basis for a require-
ment that it must be made a party. Again, the Court pointed
out that the Fund's liability does not arise until there has been
a default in the payment of compensation due under the award.
Unfortunately, nothing in the statutes suggests when the
Fund should be joined in compensation proceedings. The most
plausible explanation given by the Court is that the "Legisla-
41 Baker v. Davis, 530 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1975).
0 336 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1960).
[Vol. 65
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ture never thought of it.151 To prevent such cases in the future,
the Court suggested that the Board on its own initiative ought
to make the Uninsured Employers Fund a party, when it dis-
covers that the employer is not insured, so as to allow the Fund
to defend against unmeritorious claims.
1, 532 S.W.2d at 14. The Court also said:
We are fully aware that in the shark-infested waters of workmen's compensa-
tion litigation there may be fraud and collusion between claimants and non-
covered or otherwise judgment-proof employers. However, we did not write
this law and it is neither our responsibility nor our prerogative to shore it up
against the tides of inequity. The legislature opened the door, and it is up
to the Legislature to close it if it so desires.
Id.

